Towards an Arts Education for Cultural Citizenship

Pat Thomson, Christine Hall, Lexi Earl and Corinna Geppert,

School of Education, The University of Nottingham


In May 2018 The Guardian published a letter which expressed ‘grave concern’ about the decline in arts subjects in English secondary schools (https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2018/may/08/british-artists-ebacc-will-damage-creativity-and-self-expression). The 100 signatories read like a catalogue to a block-busting exhibition; they included Anish Kapoor, Antony Gormley, Tacita Dean, Tracey Emin, Grayson Perry and Rachel Whiteread. The letter argues that the English Baccalaureate, a school performance measure consisting of a set of subjects excluding the arts:

(1) deprives young people of “opportunities for personal development in the fields of self-expression, sociability, imagination and creativity”, and
(2) puts “one of our largest and most successful global industries at risk, one worth £92bn a year to the UK economy.”

The artists state that, contra the emphasis on English, Maths and Science, a “A good education fit for the 21st century, must be broad and balanced.” They conclude that “Every child should have equal access to the benefits that the arts and culture bring, not just a privileged few.”

The terms of this argument, which are familiar in the UK, have so far failed to deliver any change in government policy. Discussion of risks to the economy, individual self-expression, access and equality of opportunity - relatively weak forms of social justice (Gale and Densmore, 2000; Gewirtz, 2001) – have not been persuasive. Our interest here is in reframing this argument to afford a stronger articulation of social justice and a stronger claim for government action to support arts education. This is not simply to defend the arts against what we have described elsewhere as a ‘perfect storm’ for arts education – the combined effects of funding cuts, university admission advice, school responses to audit and markets, and the ongoing school subject hierarchy which places arts near the bottom (Thomson, Hall, Earl, & Geppert, in review). Rather, it is to link education and the arts to everyday life in a democratic state and the ethical and policy questions that arise from taking this perspective. Accordingly, in this chapter, taking the UK as our context, we work theoretically to consider arts education as a right, and as integral to cultural citizenship.

The chapter proceeds in three steps. Firstly we consider the notion of culture and how arts education might relate to it. We then address the question of cultural rights, and arts education as a right. We conclude by examining cultural citizenship, and the implications for arts education.

Culture

The seminal work of cultural theorist Raymond Williams (1961Ch. 5) noted three definitional categories of culture: (1) as an idealised state which refers to a universal human condition and timeless values, (2) as a documentary through which human thought and experiences are imaginatively and creatively recorded and (3) as a social description of a ‘particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values’ (p. 51) including elements not usually seen as culture, such
as the structure of the family, and the organisation of production. Williams suggested that each of these three had useful elements and that examining the relationships between the three definitions is important. An idealised approach could be particularly useful, Williams proposed, as a means of generating directions for change.

Another key thinker on culture, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, took a not dissimilar position. Geertz suggested culture was ‘socially established structures of meaning’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 12). He compared social life to a spider’s web – neither the spider nor the web can be understood separately. Culture is the context in which humans are suspended, a context of their/our own making. Social events, behaviours and institutions are not ‘caused’ by context, Geertz suggested, but rather can be explained and described contextually. Individuals and groups are equally important in interpreting, mediating, influencing, creating and maintaining culture(s): they are both produced by, and producers of, specific cultural contexts.

Contemporary anthropologists still take much the same view, taking culture as a way of seeing things, a way of thinking and making sense of the world. Culture is...

...a range of things and often certain types of things: houses, kilns, paintings, books of poetry, flags, tortillas, English breakfast tea, samurai swords, cricket bats... There is a materiality to culture. ... my body is cultural, or enculturated... (Engelke, 2017, p. 32)

Culture is taken to be omni-present – it is elite and popular, national and international and local, everyday and institutional, professional and amateur, kitsch and refined.

In the book Common Culture, Paul Willis also argues for culture as plural (Willis, with Jones, Canaan, & Hurd, 1990). Concerned particularly with youth cultures, Willis suggests that particular aged, gendered and raced cultures have been marginalized in contemporary Britain. In line with Williams’ concept of the ideal in culture, he offers a vision of an overarching common culture in which all (sub)cultures are equally valued for their difference. Later critical work on culture (e.g. Appadurai, 1996; Beck, 1997; Castells, 2000) takes account of the ways in which cultures are now globally connected through digital communications, globalized media and financial markets, commercial practices, environmental risks, voluntary and forced travel across borders and global quangos. Flows, mobilities, networks from above and below create both opportunities for and challenges to cultures and to everyday meaning-making.

In England, the Arts Council set out a ten year strategic framework in 2010 (Arts Council England, 2010). Entitled Great art and culture for everyone it states:

We believe it is every child’s birthright to have the opportunity to experience the arts, to access the knowledge in our libraries, and to see the wonderful objects within our museums and learn about the stories behind them. (p. 35)

The language here is of the right to have an opportunity, rather than the right to participate. The focus is on accessibility to arts and culture. Arts Council England’s framework also elides culture with the arts, with libraries as places of knowledge and with the ‘wonderful objects’ and stories in museums. This suggests an institutional and canonical approach to culture, but it is also a brief to support a wide range of activities, from community arts to high status national organisations. The ACE strategy aims to maintain this breadth of engagement through supporting arts and cultural education programmes, many offered via local Cultural Education Partnerships. These partnerships are themselves supported by the Arts Council’s Cultural Education Portal, through which data on participation at local, regional and national level can be accessed. This enables the Arts Council to
check that its funding is used to ensure that cultural provision is varied to respect the tastes of a diverse and segmented national audience.

Evrard (1997) identifies the modernist logic of this approach, which focuses on culture as a ‘thing’ that can be distributed, access to which can be measured against specified targets and outcomes (see also Rose, 1991; Strathern, 2000). Evrard argues that this kind of cultural policy approach predates neoliberal government, though it has been easily laminated into the audit agendas that typically accompany marketised and contractualised modes of governing (Pollitt, 2011). It is perhaps not surprising then that Arts Council England’s rationale for their youth strategies takes an individualised and economic turn, rather than an elaboration of cultural rights:

Involvement with arts and culture is crucial to imagination, self-expression and creativity in young people. It also develops the skills that fuel the success of the UK’s creative industries, and that will result in the next generation of creative talent across the country. (https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/how-we-make-impact/children-and-young-people)

Access to arts and culture is to be directed towards national ends.

This approach – access to culture as a canon, a thing and an economy - can be compared with an approach that understands culture as historically situated, social and semiotic.

**Arts education and/as culture**

Culture is more than just the arts, but the arts are integral to it. They offer a wide range of media, platforms, genre, heritages and practices for the processes of making meanings. The arts are concerned with the social and semiotic; arts education both produces and reproduces cultures. How an arts curriculum is understood and enacted is culturally particular: the arts, and arts education, are in situational contexts and social relations which constrain some possibilities and enable others (Becker, 1984).

In England, arts education is often dominated by the idea of self-expression and framed by school and national curriculum instrumentalism and audit. Expressivism, Biesta argues, is a limited approach to an arts curriculum which runs the risk of

... obliterating the educational dimension from art education. The quality that matters here is not the aesthetic quality – or at least not the aesthetic quality per se – but what we might term the existential quality of what and who is being expressed, a quality that has to do with how children and young people can exist well, individually and collectively, in the world and with the world. (Biesta, 2017, p. 14)

In other words, an arts education which prioritizes self-expression risks focusing too much on the individual and not sufficiently on the social. It’s all spider and no web. Biesta argues that the deficit of expressionism becomes apparent when we ask questions about what kinds of voice and self are being expressed.

What if the voice that expresses itself is racist? What if the creativity that emerges is destructive? Or what if the identity that poses itself is egocentric or, with the words of Emmanuel Levinas (1991, p.44), ego-logical, that is, just pursuing the logic of the ego? These questions indicate that the educational concern can never be about the expression of voice, creativity and identity as such, but has to engage with ... far more important and also far more difficult question(s)... (Biesta, 2017, p. 14)
These are ethical, political and socio-cultural questions that require ongoing discussion. They imply an approach to art education which is dialogic, based on debate. However, the expressivist approach is, like arts policy, framed by instrumentalist and audit approaches to schooling in general and to arts education in particular. Such approaches rest on the assumption that the arts do something: produce workers for the creative industries, or allow students to do well in other academic subjects. That the arts have effects which can be made explicit and thus measured.

This rhetoric of effects and accountability via audit and measurement obscures the immediate experiences of arts practices, and, by constructing the arts as a thing in and of itself, deflects attention from the ways in which the arts reproduce and produce inequities in the wider social context. Gaztambide-Fernandez proposes that the rhetoric of effects should be replaced with a rhetoric of cultural production (Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2013). He suggests that seeing the arts as cultural practice and using the rhetoric of cultural production foregrounds the importance of symbolic creativity - of making meaning - in defining the purposes of arts education, rather than relying on narrowly instrumentalist or individualist rationales. He proposes that

... such an approach seeks to account for the patterns of interaction that evolve in different contexts and under particular material and symbolic conditions. In this sense, culture is not what people are, what people have, or even what people value; culture is what people do. (p 226)

Arts education in this sense, then, is a process of cultural production which occurs in specific places, at particular times, with actual people and things, within wider social relations and directed to particular purposes and interests. To participate in the arts is to be a creative and critical cultural consumer and producer (Banks, 2017).

We take this understanding forward into a discussion of arts education and cultural rights.

Cultural rights

Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’ (http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/). The right to culture is inseparable from other human rights and vital to the health of democratic societies. As UNESCO puts it, ‘Accessing and enjoying culture is an important part of being a citizen, a member of a community and, more widely, a member of society.’ Here rights are explicitly linked to citizenship and to participation in the wider community.

UNESCO argues that cultural rights are crucial at this moment, given the global challenges to social and environmental sustainability:

At a time when artists, cultural minorities, cultural heritage and cultural expressions are increasingly under attack, defending the cultural rights of individuals and communities has never been more important. (http://www.unesco.org/culture/culture-sector-knowledge-management-tools/11_Info%20Sheet_Cultural%20Rights.pdf)

Cultural rights are, according to UNESCO, central to questions of social sustainability and social justice. Thus the maintenance of heritage languages, artistic traditions, artefacts and architectures are vital. Equally important is everyday cultural participation in which people do what they find valuable, enjoyable and meaningful – from singing in church, knitting, performing in community
plays, to making YouTube videos (Miles and Gibson, 2016). Governments have a key role in ensuring such cultural rights.

Cultural rights are theoretically underdeveloped (Symonides, 1998), and in the UK, this lacuna is also political. The UK has ratified the UN Declaration of Human Rights, but cultural rights have not been incorporated into specific national laws, although this move is under consideration in Scotland (Boyle and Hughes, 2018). The rights addressed by the UK Equalities Commission are generally socio-economic, and often related to discrimination on the grounds of race, gender and disability. These priorities perhaps explain why there has been little debate about the risks inherent in addressing the guarantee of cultural rights – for instance, the risks involved in reifying cultures, promoting some cultural practices at the expense of others, maintaining parochial and potentially politically insular groups, and preventing the natural evolution of cultural practices and meaning making (Reidel, 2010). Portolés and Šešić (2017) however suggest that this lack of debate about cultural rights is a more widespread international phenomenon:

... economic, social, and cultural rights have generally been less attended to than civil and political rights, cultural rights have been particularly neglected, and sometimes been termed the ‘cinderella’ of human rights. (p.160)

Understandings about cultural rights and citizenship are thus situated in a discussion which is emergent and scattered across disciplines and organisations.

Rights are of prime concern to legal scholars. Laura Reidel (2010) for instance sought a definition of culture that ensured that the cultural heritages of minority groups could be legally protected. At the same time she wanted to prevent cultural heritage from becoming fixed in time and/or narrowly parochial and socially divisive. She argues

The definition of culture that I propose, in addition to placing the emphasis on shared norms, meaning, and practices also stipulates that those cultures that are eligible for protection by cultural rights are those that express a comprehensive world view. This provides a way to limit the cultures that are worthy of protection, and it bases the distinction on the idea of what culture provides to its members. Culture that is worthy of protection is not merely that which characterizes the way people tend to form groups with distinctive characteristics, but those that are valuable to their members and enrich their lives. (p. 70)

Reidel’s definition of cultural rights would not however apply to youth cultures in the ways that Willis proposes. Nor does it encapsulate the kind of an ideal society of difference that both he and Williams envisaged. There are limitations to legal definitions of rights.

Sen (2004) offers an alternative to a legal take, suggesting that rights are primarily ethical demands. Rights arise from and refer to significant human freedoms, such as the right not to be subject to violence. Rights are not intended to describe utilitarian necessities such as access to affordable transport. Sen argues that, because rights are ethical, they depend on reasoned public discussion and advocacy; this may lead to legislation but, equally, may not. The right to culture is one example of an ethical matter that is not subject to specific legislation, although some laws, such as anti-discrimination law, might be relevant to its realisation. The ethical nature of rights, Sen suggests, requires correlative duties; that is, people need to accept that it is their duty to ensure that rights are enacted in everyday life and in institutions. From Sen’s perspective, understanding and ensuring cultural rights are entirely dependent on public debate and institutional actions. Neither one is sufficient in itself.
A similar ethical stance is taken by political theorists who are concerned with the ways in which difference and diversity of class, religion, race, age, gender and sexuality are included or excluded in political decision-making and social life (e.g. Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Kymlicka, 2001; Taylor, 1994). This is not the same as a focus on the right to cultural participation, an approach taken in cultural sociology and cultural studies.

Cultural studies and sociology do maintain a focus on diversity but focus on participation in culture(s) as opposed to cultural participation in social, political and economic life. Sociologist Pakulski (1997) for instance suggests that cultural rights involve the right to symbolic presence (as opposed to symbolic marginalization), dignifying representation as opposed to stigmatisation, and the propagation of identity and maintenance of lifestyles rather than assimilation. These rights require more than participation in political processes; they are instantiated – or not - in a wider public sphere. Pakulski’s approach to cultural rights includes, inter alia, media, the arts, and cultural institutions.

The ‘participation in culture(s)’ approach directs attention to one of the most important dimensions of citizenship (which) concerns the styles and forms of language, cultural models, narratives, discourses that people use to make sense of their society, interpret their place in it, construct courses of action and thereby give rise to new demands for rights, which we may call cultural rights. (Delanty, 2002, p. 66).

In other words, a ‘participation in culture’ approach to rights directs attention to agency. An agentic social semiotic approach to culture positions cultural rights as worthwhile and purposeful participation in social meaning-making. Williams’ tripartite definition of the ideal, the documentary and the social are incorporated in a rights approach, but there is a cultural practice orientation - we are directed to discourses, narratives and representations, the ways in which these are interpreted and produced, where this consumption and production occurs, under what conditions, and in whose interests these cultural rights are exercised.

**Arts education and/as cultural rights**

Thinking about arts education and its contribution to cultural rights immediately draws us back to questions of access. This is not simply a matter of how much of the arts is available to which students and for how long. In England, lack of access to an arts education is in itself enough to raise serious concerns - there is less and less time spent on the arts in primary schools (National Society for Art and Design Education, 2016). The increasing pressure on testing literacy and numeracy, and the ways in which test results can trigger dramatic interventions in schools, are undoubtedly a significant cause of the diminution of arts learning. Funding cuts also mean that fewer specialist teachers can be employed; the emphasis on ‘core’ subjects in teacher education means that trainee teachers get very little time to learn how to teach the arts. In secondary schools, while some arts subjects are usually compulsory in the junior years, they are often given little time compared to the ‘academic ‘ subjects necessary for success in school audit measures. The situation in senior secondary, as the opening to our chapter suggests, is rapidly getting worse (Johnes, 2017). The arts are increasingly seen as something suitable for students unable to undertake the most valued qualifications.

However, the national picture obscures a complex and more unequal geography. Some schools, particularly those serving more affluent communities are likely to retain the arts, often in the form of enrichment and extra-curricular activities (Kenway and Koh, 2017). A number of schools with a more mixed demographic also have a focus on the arts; this is part of their identity and integral to
their marketing. Elsewhere, somewhat paradoxically, students who are seen as ‘not very academic’ are more likely to be enrolled in the arts subjects that remain on their schools’ curricula. This gives rise to the question of what kinds of arts education are being made available, and to whom. All arts education is not the same.

Following Gaztambide-Fernandez’ argument about arts as cultural production leads to the argument that arts education contributes to cultural rights in two ways - as everyday cultural production, and as a long term contribution to out-of-school life. We need to ask - which students are engaged in which kinds of arts based social and semiotic work? There is little empirical data to help answer this question. However, we do know that elite private schools offer arts enrichment programmes which complement and supplement what families offer to their children. These arts activities are directed to ensuring that those young people destined for positions of influence and power in society are ‘cultural omnivores’, possessed of the range of cultural capital now most valued (Friedman, 2012). These young people are equally at home at the opera or listening to grime, equally open to being interested in obscure performance art or slam poetry.

Elite independent and state schools are more likely to offer art history or teach it as part of their arts programmes and to afford to take students on regular visits to galleries and theatres locally, nationally and internationally (see Powell, 2017 for an explanation of why arts knowledge is important in cultural consumption and production ). They can mount lavish school productions and regularly employ artists as part of their curriculum. By contrast, under-funded state schools struggle to offer the same variety of subjects and opportunities. Concerns about students’ futures can mean that they offer vocationally oriented arts courses rather than arts offerings that are seen as ‘bookish’. Within the same arts subject, different students are often offered different experiences. (See for example Howard’s (2018) doctoral study of the Arts Award, which shows marked differences in pedagogy and in cultural capital offered to middle and working class youth).

Raising the issue of rights thus raises important questions about whether all students, as Stevenson suggests, are equally positioned to

make sense of contemporary transformations .. (and have) the space to share and critically interrogate diverse experiences and practices, enabling them to consider how we might best ensure the flourishing of each and everyone of us in an increasingly interconnected world (Stevenson, 2010, p. 289)

This brings us to the final plank of our argument, cultural citizenship, as it is citizenship which ensures rights.

**Cultural citizenship**

At its most obvious, if we accept that cultural production is a right, then there is clearly a democratic deficit in English schooling. Different students are offered very different chances to develop cultural citizenship.

Citizenship, like culture and rights, is a contested term. It can be taken as legal membership of a particular nation state, or be seen as a practice in which an individual assumes the duties, obligations and behaviours of a citizen as laid out in law and in expected and often inexplicit norms. The term citizenship is also used in connection with membership of an organisation and often in a moral sense – someone is a good citizen of a school community for example.
Understandings about citizenship are historically and socially specific, with different kinds of states affording different duties and benefits (Cooper, 2018). Citizenship is often connected with some kind of public political assembly – a polis – and the right to speak, be heard and participate in decision-making (Kivisto, 2015). And, as the history of suffrage attests, participation in the polis has been subject to ongoing contestation along class, gender and race lines (Lister, 2003). There are also varying political views of citizenship, and the role of the state in relation to its citizens (Van Gunsteren, 1998). In Western countries these differences generally polarise around various versions of a liberal individualism where the nation-state acts primarily to support the activities of autonomous and economically oriented citizens (Jessop, 2015). However, the liberal individualist spectrum is further differentiated by the stance taken towards the civic-republican view of citizenship – whether, how much and how citizens are able to take part in democratic debate, the kinds of public forums that are available and their affordances, and the degree of freedom able to be exercised in public life (Balibar, 2015; Bellamy, 2008). If we take a view of cultural citizenship informed by the notion of culture as social and semiotic, and of cultural rights as the moral right and freedom to participate in social meaning-making, we will be particularly concerned with the civic-republican aspects of citizenship. Economic aspects are also important in as much as they enable or restrict democratic participation.

Bryan Turner (2007) suggests that societies are faced with two contradictory citizenship principles: of scarcity and solidarity. He argues that where social inequality is intensified by neoliberalist policies, citizenship becomes the major marker and maker of social solidarity. This aptly describes the context in which we write and in which questions of identity, civic virtue and community are under duress. This is not simply our view, of course, and there are already some literatures that use this approach in developing the concept of cultural citizenship. Boele Van Hansbroek (2010) for instance argues that cultural citizenship means more than simply recognising cultural group heritage and membership. Because it is concerned with social meaning making, cultural citizenship needs to take account of limiting contexts, such as the commercialisation of cultural processes and practices. But it is also concerned with agency. Citizenship is something that is lived, and done.

Boele Van Hansbroek argues that cultural citizenship is ‘the ability to co-author the cultural context in which one lives’ (p. 69). Because one cannot be a citizen alone, he sees authorship as a collective process, co-authorship. He translates political citizenship concerns with equity, difference and the right for all to be heard, into the practice of co-authoring. He offers a civic-republican view, seeing citizenship not only as an individual legal entitlement laid down in a vertical relation with the state, but also as a social role, namely the role of co-producer of the political (or cultural) community. … (This) is basically a horizontal relation with fellow citizens (p. 326)

Boele Van Hensbroek suggests that a focus on the horizontal does not negate the context of vertical relations. Rather

...it draws attention to a range of societal and socio-psychological preconditions that need to be fulfilled for the actual practice of citizenship roles. It can, in addition, draw attention to the broader historically specific societal dynamics of power and class relations, institutional arrangements, and social, political and economic systems which frame citizens’ action. (p. 326)

We are drawn to the agentic and potentially quotidian orientation taken by Boele Van Hensbroek. We also see value in the approach taken by our colleague Nick Stevenson (2003). He too takes a social semiotic and civic-republican approach to the question of cultural citizenship. He points to the importance of moving beyond nation-statist views, arguing that recognising the continuing importance of democratic notions of a civil society means taking account of globalisation, digitised communications, and the politics of difference. He suggests that cultural citizenship – and the idea
of Willis’ (1990) common culture - now demands a cosmopolitan approach, which reconciles the popular and everyday with elite cultural practices. Stevenson defines cosmopolitan cultural citizenship through three interlinked criteria:

Cultural citizenship can be said to have been fulfilled to the extent to which society makes commonly available the semiotic material cultures necessary in order to make social life meaningful, critique practices of domination, and to allow for the recognition of difference under conditions of tolerance and mutual respect.

This is a normative notion of cultural citizenship which brings together the social semiotic work of meaning-making, (which we take as cultural production when applied to arts education), with contextual and policy matters (access and opportunity to produce) and ethical questions (how difference, equity, power relations and critique are afforded and constrained). This threesome of practice, context and ethics are integral to thinking about arts education and citizenship.

**Arts education and/as cultural citizenship**

Community arts and socially engaged practitioners see a strong connection between arts practices and citizenship (Jeffers and Moriarty, 2017). The arts provide opportunities for representations that challenge dominant discourse, opportunities for ethical praxis and collective reimagining through the provision of counter-spaces and, sometimes, explicit social and political action (Elliott, Silverman, & Bowman, 2016). This is also a position long taken by some arts educators. Drama practitioners for example have long said that applied, community and participatory theatre and the family of associated ensemble pedagogies, create and support active citizenship (Neelands, 2009; Nicholson, 2005). Drama creates empathy, which is key to an equitable politics of difference. The processes of drama also encourage students to develop communication, collaboration, debate and decision-making (Braver, 2002). However, this is arts as a means of learning and exercising political citizenship, not about cultural citizenship per se.

The argument for thinking of arts education as cultural citizenship is well expressed by Paul Kuttner (2016):

> Not only can arts education serve as a space for developing and claiming cultural citizenship; we can think of arts education in general as a process of developing cultural citizens. No matter what other outcomes arts educators seek, we are teaching students about their roles and responsibilities in relation to artistic creation and consumption. We are helping to shape students’ capacities and orientations towards participating in an important aspect of cultural life (p. 74).

Kuttner (2016), like Gaztambide-Fernandez, is interested in social action and social justice. He suggests that the notion of cultural citizenship as meaning-making provides a way to link the everyday, heritage and bedroom cultures of young people with larger political challenges related to globalisation, privatisation and commercialisation (c.f. Dolby and Rizvi, 2008). He argues in particular for an arts education which supports young people to change their worlds – an activist view of citizenship – which uses arts media, genres and platforms to express opinions and explore options for change (see Soep, 2010 for an example through youth radio).

Kuttner (2016 p. 76) proposes three ‘types’ of co-authoring citizenship practices that might be offered in and through arts education programmes:

1. an informed cultural citizen who ‘has the capacity to understand, appreciate, and critique works of art within a larger social, political, artistic, or cultural context’,
(2) a participatory cultural citizen who is involved in ‘producing, remixing, and sharing original artistic works. She has a strong connection to her own cultural heritage, along with the freedom to explore new forms of expression and to share in cross-cultural exchange’ and (3) a justice-oriented cultural citizen who can ‘critically analyze the ways that the arts are implicated in processes of oppression and resistance’, works to counter dominant oppressive representations and practices and uses art practice to make changes in communities through individual and collection action.

Kuttner advocates an expanded notion of an arts education with a justice-oriented citizen at its heart, critically and systematically analysing power, advocating for marginalized communities and stories, using art for justice in communities via collective action.

While we agree with Kuttner’s sentiments we are troubled on two grounds. Firstly, justice-oriented cultural citizenship via arts education is a big ask given the current state of English schooling and its arts education curriculum, and the situation of arts educators (see also Addison and Burgess, 2012). Arts educators are on the defensive and need to maintain practices that push at what arts education might be, while not falling foul of the kinds of conservative rhetoric and audit and market driven practices that hold sway. Secondly, and as importantly, we are concerned that a focus on the local sometimes denies young people, especially those who are socially and culturally pushed to the edges, access to the kinds of cultural capitals that are held in highest esteem. We agree with Stevenson’s (2003) premise that arts education as cultural citizenship

... would need to follow an inclusive cultural strategy that offered school children a range of cultural repertoires drawn from across the popular and high cultural divide. A genuinely cosmopolitan education might seek to revalue cultural practices and narratives that more traditional forms of education had branded as unworthy. Yet such an approach would need to stop short of populism should it fail to instil a critical appreciation of artistic practices from classical music to performance art.

Practices associated with what Kuttner calls informed cultural citizenship and participatory cultural citizenship are still important, according to Stevenson – and we agree. If every child is to be a cultural omnivore, possessing the cultural capital that counts, then they must be engaged in an arts education that offers them the opportunity to produce meanings using their own funds of knowledge, heritages and teleologies. But it is also important that they should not be denied access to the kinds of knowledge and skills that will allow them to engage critically with mainstream and elite cultural practices. This is, as Siegesmund (2013) puts it, an arts education which develops wide-awakeness to the world, and supports well-informed citizens to reimagine possibilities for living together.

In sum

We have argued that arts education can be understood as a process of social meaning making and that this is a form of cultural production. Engaging actively and critically in cultural production is a right, understood as both an ethical question and an institutional obligation. The right to participate in arts based social meaning making is integral to citizenship; thus the equitable provision of arts education is vital for all young people regardless of who or where they are. This is not currently the case in England, where arts provision is inequitably distributed, with elite schools generally offering their students the richest arts experiences. We have also argued that, in addition to attending to this social injustice, it is important to take forward debates about the purposes, knowledge and practices of arts education.
In concluding, it is also important to state that an arts education for cultural citizenship is not simply an idea, or an ideal, but can be seen in various forms in different parts of the world. We think for example of the potential of intercultural arts practices to bring diverse communities together to create a ‘third space’ for head/hands/hearts conversations (Burnard, Mackinlay, & Powell, 2016). We think of the possibilities of classrooms where popular music and political performance decentre the usual and conventional genres and practices (Camarero and Cruzado, 2013; Tuulikki, 2017). We think of the student-run art workshop Room 13 and the many Rooms 13s it has inspired (Souness and Failrey, 2005). We think of drama programmes that engage young people pushed to the edges of schooling to articulate and speak back to their public misrepresentations and political marginalization (Gallagher, 2007). While none of these examples, and the others we could list, including many that we have worked with, are fully realised democratic spheres, they all offer insights into how cultural citizenship might be made pedagogical. In doing so, they also offer the promise that hope, and the ideal, can indeed be made practical.

References


